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The Population Factor: China’s 
Family Planning Policy in the 1990s
Tyrene White
5
In 1980 China's leaders announced two economic goals for the year 
2000; quadrupling the 1980 gross value of output and achieving a per 
capita gross national product of US$1,000. To achieve those goals, the 
leadership took its first steps toward implementing a major economic 
reform program, steps that quickly began to stimulate economic 
growth. In some countries, the institution of a new set of economic 
policies and structures might have been enough to ensure the 
achievement of the long-term goals for the year 2000. In China, how­
ever, the leadership believed that economic growth was only half of 
the equation. The other half was a huge population that had already 
grown to 1 billion and threatened to grow to 1.4 billion or more by 
the year 2000. Achieving long-term economic goals, particularly per 
capita ^oals, meant finding a way to control the denominator (popula­
tion base) as well as the numerator (gross economic indicators). With 
that in mind, the leadership set a specific population goal for the year 
2000—to hold the total population within 1.2 billion. To achieve that 
goal, they called on all couples of childbearing age to have only one 
child, granting exceptions only for minority nationalities and a few 
narrowly defined categories of Han nationality couples.
A decade later, the blunt policy of 1980 had become more complex, 
with different localities and regions implementing their own policies. 
Generally speaking, however, the state continued to limit almost all 
urban couples to one child, while treating rural couples more le­
niently. By the late 1980s, rural couples with a single female child 
(dunu hu, or "single-daughter households") were allowed to have a 
second child after an interval of five years. Regardless of the sex of 
the second child, a third child was forbidden.
This "one-son-or-two-child" policy brought central policies into bet­
ter alignment with rural realities, improving the climate for rural en-
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forcement. Nevertheless, by the late 1980s higher-than-desired popu­
lation growth rates had begun to cast strong doubt on China's ability 
to meet the population target of 1.2 billion by the year 2000, or even 
the more relaxed target of 1.25 billion that was adopted in the mid- 
1980s. In 1990 the fourth national census showed that the population 
had grown to 1.13 billion by July 1, and by the end of the year it 
reached 1.143 billion, exceeding the population target for the Seventh 
Five Year Plan period (1986-90) by 30 million. With another fertility 
peak coming in the early 1990s, experts predicted an annual average 
population increase of at least 16 million during the 1991-2000 period, 
a rate of growth that forced official recognition of what had become 
increasingly obvious: despite relentless efforts to enforce a strict birth 
limitation policy, China's population is very likely to exceed 1.3 billion 
by the year 2000 and grow to 1.6 billion by the middle of the 21st cen­
tury.
This realization brought another round of urgent calls for strict con­
trol of population growth, demands that population targets for 1991 
be met, and a flurry of family planning meetings to plot new strate­
gies for reducing rural birth rates. These activities were reinforced by 
a new "Decision" on family planning, issued by the Chinese Commu­
nist Party (CCP) Central Committee and State Council in May 1991. i 
While stating that China's existing policy would not change, it 
stressed the need for strict implementation of that policy, particularly 
in the countryside. As a result, evidence of a new family planning 
propaganda campaign could be found in many towns and vdlages in 
the summer of 1991;^ whether the campaign rhetoric could be trans­
lated into improved performance, however, remained an open ques­
tion.
The Evolution of China's Birth Planning Policy
In 1949 the first and most basic task that confronted the CCP was to 
provide basic subsistence for more than 500 million people. At the 
time, Mao Zedong was confident that once the class exploitation, for­
eign imperialism, and bureaucratic corruption of previous regimes 
were eradicated, the new people's dictatorship could feed, clothe, edu­
cate, and gainfully employ China's growing population while simulta-
' "Decision of the CCP Central Committee State Council on Stepping Up Family 
Planning Work, Strictly Controlling Population Growth," Xinhua Domestic Service, 
June 12, 1991, in FBIS (Foreign Broadcast Information Service), Daily Report, China, 
June 20, 1991, pp. 33-36.
2 Personal observations during June and July 1991. New banners and freshly painted 
signs were visible in towns and villages across Hebei, Shandong, and Hubei. *
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neously maintaining a high rate of investment in sodal and economic 
development. Over the next several years, however, some within the 
leadership came to believe that even rapid economic gains could be con­
sumed, literally, by an expanding population base, and that comprehen­
sive economic planning along Stalinist lines required a certain degree of 
predictability about population growth and population movement. With 
that in mind, in the early 1950s they began a modest program that sanc­
tioned contraceptive use and provided contraceptive education. Eventu­
ally, however, they began to focus on comprehensive birth planning as 
the best approach to population issues.
Unlike the concept of family planning that gained currency in the 
West in the postwar era, birth planning (jihua shengyu) in China did 
not rest on the liberal premise that couples have the ability and right 
to exercise personal control over the number and spacing of their chil­
dren. Instead, birth planning was viewed as part of the larger process 
of socialist economic planning. It was feared that unregulated popula­
tion growth might endanger the successful fulfillment of annual and 
five-year economic plans. That threat could be stemmed by bringing 
population issues into the central planning process and regulating 
population growth in a predictable fashion.
Although individual leaders (most notably, Zhou Enlai and Deng 
Xiaoping) embraced birth planning and population control from the 
start, the Malthusian overtones of any population-control policy made 
the idea extremely controversial.^ After the Great Leap Forward 
(1958-60), however, soaring birth rates and economic difficulties led 
Prime Minister Zhou Enlai to press hard for the incorporation of pop­
ulation targets into the planning process. Propelled by sample surveys 
that indicated population growth rates over 27 per thousand in 1962 
and over 33 per thousand in 1963, it was decided that the rate of ur­
ban population growth should be brought under 20 per thousand by 
1965, 15 per thousand by 1970, and 10 per thousand by 1975. During the 
third and fourth five-year plans (1966-70 and 1971-75), population 
growth rates were scheduled to continue their descent, with an average
3 One of the foremost advocates of population control, Ma Yinchu, was personally at­
tacked by Mao Zedong and branded as a rightist in 1957. Despite Mao’s behavior in 
this case, however, he did not reject birth planning. On the contrary, he was the first 
among China's senior leaders to embrace the idea; and despite the glorification of hu­
man labor power during the Great Leap Forward, he never repudiated the concept. 
What he rejected was the need to reduce population growth rates or the overall size of 
the population, not the notion of linking material planning with population planning. 
Mao's place in the evolution of the birth planning program is explored in more detail in 
the author's forthcoming book. Against the Grain: The State-Peasant Struggle over Child- 
Bearing in Contemporary China.
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annual drop of one per thousand.'* And finally, in September 1965, Zhou 
Enlai set China's first long-range population goal: reducing population 
growth to ten per thousand by the end of the 20th century. This ambi­
tious goal marked the first step toward including family planning in the 
state economic planning process and set the stage for more aggressive 
efforts to reduce fertility rates.®
The pursuit of these goals was disrupted by the first phase of the 
Cultural Revolution (1966-69), which brought all regular government 
functions to a standstill. By the early 1970s, however, the population 
question was back on the agenda and China's first serious and sus­
tained birth limitation campaign got under way. In the radicalized po­
litical climate of the day, the health and welfare of women and chil­
dren continued to serve as the public justification for family planning 
and birth control programs until after Mao's death in 1976. In practi­
cal terms, however, from 1970 onward the logic of centralized eco­
nomic planning provided the rationale for population-control plans.
Placing birth control under the rubric of comprehensive economic 
planning meant a change in specific birth control measures and prac­
tices during the 1970s. First, the State Council called for the establish­
ment of family planning offices (jihua shengyu bangongshi) within the 
public health bureaucracy at each level of government. Subsequently, 
leading groups for family planning were established in 1973, with 
subordinate staff offices to support their work. Unlike the specialized 
family planning offices, the leading groups were ad hoc committees 
composed of leading CCP and government cadres, usually deputy 
party secretaries and vice governors. In addition, they included repre­
sentatives of every bureaucratic system involved in family planning 
work and of relevant organizations such as the Women's Federation 
and the Communist Youth League. Their function was to coordinate 
family planning work within their territorial jurisdiction and to guar­
antee that local officials would provide leadership to the effort. Fi­
nally, basic-level units—factories, enterprises, neighborhoods, rural 
people's communes, and production brigades—were required to cre­
ate a "family planning work network" (jihua shengyu gongzuo wang). 
Most of the cadres who staffed this extensive system of offices lacked 
specific training in family planning work, and many had concurrent
Deng Lichun and Ma Hong, eds., Dangdai zhongguode weisheng shiye (Health work in 
contemporary China, volume 2) (Beijing: Zhongguo shehui kexue chubanshe, 1986), 
p. 234; Fang Weizhong, ed., Zhonghua renmin gongheguo jingji dashi (1949-1980) (Compi­
lation of major economic events of the People's Republic of China, 1949-1980) (Beijing: 
Zhongguo shehui kexue chubanshe, 1984), pp. 347-48.
5 Zhongguo gongchandang zhizheng sishinian (Forty years of administration by the Chi­
nese Communist Party) (Beijing: Zhonggong dangshi ziliao chubanshe, 1989), p. 264.
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responsibilities for one or more additional government jobs. Never­
theless, this top-to-bottom system was a critical first step toward the 
promotion of universal birth planning.
The new family planning drive also benefited from Mao's emphasis 
on the development of basic health services in the rural areas. To rec­
tify what Mao saw as the gross neglect of rural health care by the 
urban-oriented public health bureaucracy, beginning in the mid-1960s 
barefoot doctors with basic skills were trained and sent into rural vil­
lages, where they established clinics and provided basic health serv­
ices. In addition, hospitals were built in the communes and staffed 
with medical personnel. This system was essential to the provision of 
door-to-door toth control supplies and medical services, but funds 
were scarce. T^deal with that problem, beginning in August 1970 the 
government moved to subsidize the cost of family planning work by 
providing birth control supplies free of charge and offering reimburse­
ment for the cost of medical procedures.
The combination of attention from the center and the development 
of local organizations made it possible to promote effectively the "late, 
sparse, and few" {wan, xi, shad) policy of the early and mid-1970s, 
which stressed late marriage and fewer, more widely spaced births. 
The policy originated in February 1972 at a national work conference 
held in Hebei province and attended by delegates from 17 provinces. 
With state approval, Hebei province developed the specific guidelines 
that were adopted by most localities in 1973 and 1974. They called for 
a delay in marriage until ages 27 and 25 for urban men and women, 
respectively, and ages 25 and 23 for rural men and women. After 
marriage, couples were urged to have only two children; Hebei does 
not appear to have discriminated between urban and rural couples on 
this issue. In some other provinces, however, couples in rural areas 
were permitted to have three children. Finally, births were to be 
spaced at least four years apart, and to ensure this, campaigns to pro­
mote birth control and sterilization were carried out during 1973 and 
1974.
By 1975 the goal, structure, and content of China's birth control 
program had been firmly established. The goal was to gradually bring 
China's population growth rate down to 1 percent through annual, 
incremental reductions of one-tenth of 1 percent. The structure of the 
program paralleled that of China's state-planned economic sector, 
with the family planning organs of the public health bureaucracy re­
sponsible for national oversight and coordination, and with adminis­
trative regions (provinces, municipalities, counties) responsible for lo­
cal performance. The focus of the program was to delay childbirth, 
reduce the average number of children per couple to two (perhaps
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three in rural areas), and increase their spacing to at least four years 
apart. By 1980, however, a new leadership intent on raising standards 
of living and achieving modernization concluded that China could not 
afford the' “luxury" of a two-child policy; with an estimated popula­
tion of one billion and a fertility peak looming in the 1980s, only a 
one-child policy could break the demographic momentum that spelled 
disaster.
This “radicalization" of China's birth control program is sometimes 
attributed to reckless decisions made by the post-Mao leadership, 
decisions influenced by flawed demographic projections, a climate of 
population hysteria, and fears about economic performance. In fact, 
China's shift to a one-child policy is better understood as the product 
of the entrenched “planning" approach to population growth; if a 
two-child limit was insufficient to bring population growth down to 1 
percent and achieve the desired economic goals by the year 2000, 
then there was no alternative to a one-child policy. In other words, 
the one-child limit was a radical means to achieve long-established 
goals.
Implementation of the One-Child Policy
When the one-child limit was first promoted in 1979, two basic 
methods were used to gain mass compliance. First and most impor­
tant, the CCP relied on well-honed campaign methods of implementa­
tion, including: the use of mass propaganda in all available media; 
mobilization of all party cadres and activists to take the lead in pledg­
ing to have only one child; organization of medical teams to move 
into the countryside to carry out abortions, sterilizations, lUD inser­
tions, and other medical procedures; and mobilization of the local 
population ^or study of the new policy, followed by its immediate im­
plementation under heavy pressure from local officials (up to and in­
cluding the use of coercion). Second, the party also offered political 
and economic rewards for compliance, including preferred housing, 
better jobs, longer maternity leaves, free medical care, and educa­
tional opportunities.
In the late 1970s and the early 1980s, these methods were effective 
in gaining compliance, since administrative controls over the popula­
tion were tight and pervasive. In urban areas, couples of childbearing 
age were closely supervised in their workplaces or neighborhoods. 
Fertile women were monitored for pregnancy, and a permit system 
was established to determine who was allowed to have a child in a 
given year; those with unplanned pregnancies faced heavy fines, loss 
of their jobs and apartments, and political ostracism if they refused to
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abort the pregnancy. In rural areas a similar permit system was estab­
lished, identifying couples who were eligible to have a child in a 
given year. Women's leaders often made menstrual cycles a matter of 
public record, posting the names of all women of childbearing age 
and checking monthly to ensure that they did not become pregnant 
"outside the plan." Those who failed to comply could be compelled 
to attend study sessions daily without pay. Moreover, rural cadres, 
who controlled all aspects of the local economy, had the power to 
deny couples a means of livelihood.
As China's leaders began to implement more far-reaching reforms 
in the 1980s, however, campaign methods were increasingly at odds 
with other regime goals, making it difficult to rely solely on "shock 
drives" to enforce the one-child limit. In urban areas, campaigns were 
replaced by a permanent, institutionalized system of administrative 
control. Although many residents in overcrowded cities were willing 
to stop at one child, the administrative control system was a formida­
ble deterrent to those who were less willing.
Rural Resistance
In the vast countryside, home to 800 million peasants (80 percent of 
China's population), it was a different story. Rural reforms introduced 
between 1980 and 1985 decollectivized agriculture, reintroduced pri­
vate markets, and encouraged peasant entrepreneurship, changes that 
complicated family planning work in several respects.
First, the reforms stripped village cadres of much of their power 
over rural households; they no longer had the power to delegate col­
lective work tasks or determine income levels. With income flowing 
more directly into peasant hands, their livelihood no longer depended 
entirely on the whims of village leaders. And as some households be­
came more prosperous, they could no longer be threatened into com­
pliance with the local birth plan; couples simply paid the steep fines 
for an "unplanned" child rather than forego the opportunity to have 
a second child, particularly if the first was a girl.^
Second, village cadres were often content to collect these fines. 
Some sympathized with the desire of their fellow villagers to have ad­
ditional children, and others set negative examples by having "un­
planned" children of their own. Still others had a different motive for 
collecting fines rather than enforcing birth limits—fear of retaliation.
^ According to one former township-level family planning cadre, couples who had an 
"illegal" son took pride in paying the fine, and cadres would ceremoniously accept it. 
Cadres felt sorry for those who had a daughter, however, and would not attempt to 
collect a fine. Interview file, July 1990.
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In some vUlages, peasants exacted their revenge against aggressive 
enforcers of the birth limit through vandalism, physical assault, and
even murder.^ . , . .
Third, along with the economic reforms came political changes, the 
number of rural cadres was reduced, and many localities stopped em­
ploying the “women's leaders" who had played a crucial role m dis­
seminating birth control supplies and monitoring village women for 
unplanned pregnancies. This reduction in administrative personnel 
made it harder to enforce the policy, particularly since the remaining 
rural cadres were busy tilling their own fields or developing lucrative
family sidelines. ,Fourth, as peasants gained the right to peddle their goods in free 
markets, they also gained the right to travel beyond the borders o 
their local commune town. As peasant mobility increased, the task ot 
controlling childbearing became far more
on this “floating population," which numbered 60 million by 1989, 
became a constant headache for family planning personnel Some lo­
calities became notorious as “safe havens" for this "excess birth guer­
rilla corps," and their offspring swelled the ranks of the illegal or 
"black market" children who exist on the fringes of Chinese society.
Fifth, the reforms laid bare a major contradiction between the prop­
aganda of the one-child campaign and the reality of rural life. To pro­
mote the one-child policy, propagandists attempted to demonstrate 
the economic utility of having only one child, and prosperous one- 
child families were put forward as models for emulation. These rahon- 
al arguments were often countered by what could be observed within 
the village, however, where the division of land according to the size 
and labor power of the household gave early advantage to large fami­
lies. Campaign propaganda also took great pains to persuade peas­
ants that sons and daughters were of equal value; it condemned the 
"feudal" but widespread views that men are inherently supenor to 
women—that having a son is necessary to maintain the ancestral line 
and that men have greater economic value. In practice, however, m
7 Personal interview files from Hebei and Hubei provinces, fall 1990 and summer 
1991; Su Suining, "There Are Many Causes of Strained ® ,
Masses in the Countryside," Nongmin nbao (Peasaiits Daily), '
in FBIS, Daily Report, China, October 7, 1988, p. 13; Fan Xiangguo ar^d Huang Yuan, 
"Zhongguo 'Li' renkou" (China's "illegal" population), Xm guancha (New Observer) 4,
February 25, 1989, pp. 28-32. oo qo Cpp akoB For a moving discussion of this problem, see Fan and Huang, See
"Couples with More Than One Child Seek Shelter along the Borders of Hunan Hubei, 
SichuL, and Guizhou," Zhongguo tongxun she (January 20, 1989), in joint Publications Re­
search Service GPRS) 89-014, February 15, 1989, pp. 44-45.
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many villages women were allotted smaller portions of land than 
were men when the land was divided among village households, re­
inforcing a long-standing system of wage inequality in the country­
side. Moreover, rural couples depended entirely on their sons for 
support during old age; by tradition, daughters would marry and be­
come a part of their husband's household, and any income their 
daughter earned would be beyond the reach of her parents. Although 
the state promised young couples that a new social-security system 
would be in place by the time they reached retirement, few were will­
ing to depend on such a distant and uncertain solution. Some re­
sponded by defying the state and having two or more children, par­
ticularly if the first child was a girl. Others were simply unwilling to 
accept the birth of a daughter; in the early 1980s, female infanticide 
became a serious problem in some areas of the country, and in the 
later 1980s, selective abortion based on the sex of the fetus became an 
increasingly common practice.^
Finally, with a changing social climate in the village, many couples 
worried that having only one child (especially one female child) 
would leave them weak and vulnerable to larger families. This fear of 
sustained bullying from hostile or dominant households sometimes 
outweighed peasant fears of the state.
These cultural norms and economic realities generated great resis­
tance to the one-child limit at precisely the time it was being enforced 
most vigorously in the early 1980s. Rather than confront that resis­
tance through even tougher measures against those who desired a 
second child, a decision was made in late 1982 to focus instead on re­
ducing rapidly the number of couples having a third or additional 
child. In 1983 a major sterilization campaign got under way, targeted 
at all couples who were under 40 and had two children. Reasoning 
that this was the most efficient and effective way to make rapid prog­
ress on reducing population growth, the central government brought 
heavy pressures to bear during 1983 and 1984; each locality was given 
a "sterilization target," and mobile medical teams were sent into the 
countryside to perform sterilizations on those who had been "mobi­
lized." The results of this campaign can be seen in the figures for con­
traceptive procedures listed in Table 1. In 1983 the numbers of lUD 
insertions and abortions were much higher than in preceding or sub-
Data collection problems make it difficult to estimate just how widespread these 
practices are nationwide. However, data from the 1990 census showing an unusual sex 
ratio among children under age 10 have raised this issue anew. See "Percentages of 
Population of Different Ages of Both Sexes in 30 Provinces, Autonomous Regions, and 
Municipalities in Mainland China," People's Daily, May 21, 1991, p. 3, in FBIS, Daily 
Report, China, June 5, 1991, pp. 35-36.
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TABLE 1





1980 28.6 11.5 2.4
1981 22.8 10.3 1.5
1982 33.7 14.1 2.1
1983 58.2 17.8 5.3
1984 31.7 11.8 4.4
1985 25.6 9.6 2.3
1986 28.5 10.6 2.3
1987 34.2 13.3 2.4













Source: Judith Banister, "Population Changes and the Economy," in Joint Economic 
Committee, U.S. Congress, China's Economic Dilemmas in the 1990s: The Problems of Re­
forms, Modernization, and Interdependence, Vol. I (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government 
Printing Office, 1991), Table 2.
sequent years. Most dramatic, however, are the 1983 figures for va­
sectomies and tubal ligations, which show a fourfold increase over the 
preceding year.
Although the campaign was a success in terms of the numbers of 
sterilizations performed, it entailed heavy costs. The heaviest cost was 
imposed on those who were caught in the net of the campaign, many 
of whom were women in their middle to late thirties who had no in­
tention of having another child but were now required to undergo tu­
bal ligation. Apart from this human toll, however, the campaign had 
at least four negative consequences. First, it was costly, leaving local 
governments down to the village level with big bills that the central 
government was unwilling to pay. Second, cadre-peasant relations be­
came very tense at a time when rural stability was of the utmost im­
portance to reformers. Third, the campaign generated an angry back­
lash in the form of letters and complaints to all levels of government. 
And fourth, international reaction, particularly in the United States, 
was extremely negative.
Relaxation of the Policy and Its Enforcement
By 1984 these unforeseen problems led to subtle but important 
changes in China's family planning policy, changes that were formal-
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ized in two policy documents issued in 1984 and 1986.'o One change 
related to tactics. Cadres were informed that heavy-handed coercion 
was no longer acceptable to enforce birth limits; peasants had to be 
persuaded, not forced, to comply with the policy. In addition, peas­
ant demands for a second child were taken into account. Whereas 
only about 5 percent of all Han nationality couples (urban or rural) 
had been eligible for a second child under the official 1980 policy, the 
number of exceptions to the one-child limit had expanded to about 10 
percent of all single-child households by 1984, 20 percent by 1985, 
and nearly 50 percent by 1986. Although many of these exceptions 
were designed to account for special circumstances, by 1986 the state 
had gone halfway toward meeting peasant demands for male off­
spring. It did so by allowing individual provinces more leeway to im­
plement a two-child policy in some rural areas, and by allowing al­
most all rural couples with one daughter to have a second child. By 
1988 the State Family Planning Commission declared that the policy 
of giving preferential treatment to "single-daughter households" had 
become the standard policy across the countryside, and by 1989 four 
distinct policies were in force: (1) a two-child policy (in Guangdong, 
Hainan, Yunnan, Ningxia, Qinghai, and Xinjiang); (2) a one-son-or- 
two-child policy (in force in 18 provinces, plus less-developed areas of 
Jiangsu and Sichuan); (3) a one-child policy with some concessions for 
second births (in Beijing, Tianjin, Shanghai, and most rural areas in 
Jiangsu and Sichuan); and (4) a policy allowing two or more births per 
couple (in force among couples of minority nationality).
The purpose of this relaxation of birth limits was to make the policy 
more "acceptable to the peasants," and thus more enforceable by ru­
ral cadres, without sacrificing the overall national objective. As birth 
rates began to climb after 1985, however, it became clear that rural en­
forcement remained problematic (see Table 2). The increased mobility 
of the peasantry was a part of the problem, of course. But viewed 
from the center, the most serious problem was lax enforcement on the
For more on these family planning documents, see Tyrene White, "Birth Planning 
Between Plan and Market: The Impact of Reform on China's One-Child Policy," in U.S. 
Congress, Joint Economic Committee, China's Economic Dilemmas in the 1990s: The Prob­
lems of Reforms, Modernization, and Interdependence, Vol. I (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Gov­
ernment Printing Office, 1991), pp. 255-61. For the text of the documents, see Zhong- 
gong zhongyang dangxiao jihua shengyu weiyuanhui, Shiyizhou sanzhong quanhui yilai 
jihua shengyu zhongyao wenjian xuanbian (Selected important documents on birth plan­
ning since the Third Plenum of the Eleventh Central Committee) (Beijing: Central Party 
School Publishers, 1989).
" Zeng Yi, "Family Planning Program 'Tightening Up'?" Population and Development 
Review 2 (June 1989), p. 335.
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TABLE 2
Official Statistics for Urban and Rural Birth Rates and Natural Population 




Population Growth Rates 
Total Urban Rural
1971 30.65 21.30 31.86 23.33 15.95 24.29
1972 29.77 19.30 31.19 22.16 14.01 23.26
1973 27.93 17.35 29.36 20.89 12.39 22.03
1974 24.82 14.50 26.23 17.48 9.26 18.60
1975 23.01 14.71 24.17 15.69 9.32 16.58
1976 19.91 13.12 20.85 12.66 6.52 13.50
1977 18.93 13.38 19.70 12.06 7.87 12.64
1978 18.25 13.56 18.91 12.00 8.44 12.49
1979 17.82 13.67 18.43 11.61 8.60 12.04
1980 18.21 14.17 18.82 11.87 8.69 12.35
1981 20.91 16.45 21.55 14.55 11.31 15.02
1982 21.09 18.24 21.97 14.49 12.96 14.97
1983 18.62 15.99 19.89 11.54 10.07 12.20
1984 17.50 15.00 17.90 10.81 9.14 11.17
1985 17.80 14.02 19.17 11.23 8.06 12.51
1986 20.77 17.39 21.94 14.08 11.64 15.20
1987 21.04 N.A. N.A. 14.39 N.A. N.A.
1988 20.78 N.A. N.A. 14.20 N.A. N.A.
1989 20.83 15.98 22.28 14.33 10.24 15.59
Source: 1990 Zhongguo tongji niartjian (Beijing: Guojia tongji chubanshe, 1991), p. 89.
part of responsible officials. The early effects of rural reforms on cadre 
enforcement have already been discussed; after 1985 new and more 
insidious implementation problems began to emerge, problems for 
which there were no easy solutions.
First was the problem of early marriage and childbirth. Prior to the 
reforms, couples who sought to marry were at the mercy of rural offi­
cials, who could grant or deny their request to register for marriage. 
After the reforms, however, couples who had not reached the legal 
marriage age staged traditional village weddings without official sanc­
tion, or simply began to cohabit. They did so with their parents' 
blessing and with little fear of retaliation from local officials. The fail­
ure of the state to recognize marriages meant little in the village, and 
with more early marriages came more "early births." By the late
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1980s, family planning officials were reporting that 10 percent of all 
births each year were to women under the legal marriage age of 20
Second, the position of cadres within the village had been altered 
by political, as well as economic, reforms. A decision to promote 
younger and better-educated cadres led to a dramatic transformation 
of rural leadership between 1983 and 1990, with old cadres retiring 
and a new generation of cadres coming into power. In addition, re­
forms designed to promote autonomy and democracy at the village 
level led to a reform of the cadre system itself. Within the party, vil­
lage branch secretaries were subject to biannual elections by local 
party members; similarly, new "villagers' committee" cadres were 
subject to direct peasant election and limited to three-year terms.
Of course, these reforms did not reverse entirely the balance of 
power between cadres and peasants. Cadres continued to wield sub­
stantial power over the peasantry, and local elections were often con­
trolled from above, or by incumbent leaders. Nevertheless, by the end 
of the decade the net effect of these political and economic changes 
was to make cadres far more cautious when confronting villagers on 
volatile issues like family planning. Rather than press too hard on a 
recalcitrant couple to abort an "unplanned" pregnancy, more and 
more cadres were willing to settle for collecting a fine, which couples 
were often happy to pay if the child was a male.
To improve cadre compliance, the state attempted to link cadre sal­
aries and evaluations to their performance in meeting local birth plan­
ning goals. Usually, this "responsibility system" was set up to reward 
or punish all cadres for failure to meet a wide variety of economic, 
political, or social goals; each individual target was weighted in an 
elaborate point system, with wages and bonuses tied to the number 
of points earned during a year. Where targets were met, salaries and 
bonuses would be paid in full; where targets were exceeded, cadres 
would forfeit a certain amount of their salary and receive no merit 
pay or citations. In some areas, this system served the intended pur­
pose of increasing cadre incentives to implement the birth plan. In 
other areas, however, it merely encouraged the falsification of records 
by leaders at several levels, creating a statistical "leakage" in the late 
1980s. Village leaders, for example, who represent the first leg in Chi­
na's system of family planning statistical reporting, falsified local rec­
ords in order to avoid fines from above or confrontations within the 
village. Township officials, unwilling or unable to discover any dis-
Lin Shuangchuan, "How to View China's Population Situation," Ban yue tan (Biweekly 
Talks) 23 (December 10, 1990), pp. 12-13, in FBIS, Daily Report, China, January 10, 1991, pp. 
30-31.
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crepancies without the active assistance of village cadres, accepted the 
figures because it was in their interest to do so, securing their salaries 
and satisfying their superiors at the county level. In this way, coun­
ties and townships received recognition as advanced family planning 
units, and honest reporting that would endanger that designation was 
positively discouraged.
Third, as the rural reform process decentralized economic decision 
making and encouraged rural industrialization and commercialization, 
township and village governments were able to accrue profits from 
their collectively run enterprises. Those profits quickly became the 
major source of local revenue, and as such, the major source of cadre 
power. The development and expansion of rural industry became the 
primary means by which local governments could expand local em­
ployment, improve the standard of living, invest in public works and 
town development, and get recognition from their superiors. Yet pre­
cisely because these locally generated profits were so essential to the 
health of the local community, the desire to maximize profits fre­
quently translated into the neglect of long-term investments like edu­
cation, health, and family planning work.
This tendency to neglect non-revenue-generating investment was 
reinforced by a sweeping reform of the fiscal management system, in 
which fiscal power was decentralized down to the rural township 
level. Through a series of fiscal, enterprise, taxation, and administra­
tive reforms, local governments gained access to local taxes and ex­
trabudgetary funds, namely to money—sometimes a great deal of 
money—controlled at the local level. At the same time, in order to re­
duce the burden of central subsidies, the state gave local governments 
greater responsibility for funding programs like education, health 
care, welfare, and family planning and pressured the bureaucracies in 
charge of these and other areas to become self-financing.
How has this restructuring of economic interests affected the birth 
planning program? The central state allocates money to the family 
planning bureaucracy to pay for basic operating costs, salaries, and 
the cost of medical procedures and contraceptives. Beyond that, all 
costs for family planning must be carried by local governments—for 
example, the salaries for local personnel, the costs of transporting 
women to the township or county hospital, and the cost of propa­
ganda and educational activities. But local governments are under 
strong pressures to reinvest any revenues in profit-generating activi-
13 Yang Xudong, "Woguo nongcun jihua shengyu gongzuo zhong xuyao yanjiu 
jiejuede jige wenti" (Several issues in need of resolution in our country's rural birth 
planning work), Renkou yanjiu (Population Research) 6 (1989), pp. 62-64.
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ties, not profit-draining activities like family planning. As a result, 
family planning work has become increasingly dependent on the col­
lection of fines from people who have violated the policy. These 
funds are referred to as "excess-birth fees" (chaosheng fei). In some lo­
calities, as much as two-thirds of annual expenditures for family plan­
ning work come from these fines.
These excess-birth fees have become crucial to the maintenance of 
the family planning bureaucracy and the family planning program at 
the county level and below, so much so that family planning cam­
paigns have become linked to the bureaucratic need to collect funds. 
In one province, for example, campaigns in the late 1980s were 
launched at times when peasants were expected to be holding the 
most cash—once near the end of the spring festival, again in June or 
July after the summer harvest, and again after the second harvest in 
November. According to a former participant in these campaigns, the 
township was assigned targets for total births and other family plan­
ning indicators, but the greatest pressure was to meet the target for 
collecting fines.Once collected, most or all of the money was split 
between the township and county family planning organs, where the 
funds were essential in order to pay the salaries and bonuses of the 
family planning cadres or those who do the legwork in the villages. 
But these locally employed workers have discovered that the better 
they do their job of preventing unplanned births, the less likely they 
are to be paid, since their salary comes from the fees paid by policy 
offenders. In short, as the family planning bureaucracy has been 
pressed under the reform process to become financially self-sufficient, 
county and township officials have come to rely on the extraction of 
fines from policy violators to cover ordinary operating costs. To pursue 
its bureaucratic mission of preventing excess births, the bureaucracy has relied 
on the monies collected as a result of excess births.
The Census of 1990
By 1990 the combined-effect of these implementation problems was 
to increase anxiety over what the fourth national census, scheduled 
for July 1, 1990, would reveal about the state of China's population. It 
was hoped that the census would put to rest nagging doubts about 
reported figures for population growth over the previous five years 
and also provide an opportunity to redress problems in the statistical 
reporting system. Since many couples failed to register "illegal" births 
(often with the collusion of rural cadres), and their discovery would
Personal interview files, July 1990.
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ordinarily mean the imposition of a hefty fine and other penalties, the 
problem was how to persuade policy violators to report faithfully 
their total household size.
In March 1990 a circular that spoke directly to this problem was is­
sued by the Census Leading Group of the State Council, the State 
Family Planning Commission, and the Public Security Bureau. Reveal­
ing the extent of the concern over underreporting, the circular made 
three important points. First, it called on local cadres to reverse the 
policy of not allowing "illegal" children to register for residency, 
pointing out that registration was necessary for an accurate census 
count. Second, the circular acknowledged that some cadres had failed 
to report extraquota births in order to acquire political and material 
benefits or evade punishments, and promised that "in general" there 
would be "no further investigation" of cases in which cadres had doc­
tored the statistics, as long as they gave an accurate count for the cen­
sus. Finally, it called for "more ideological work" to persuade individ­
uals who had violated the policy to come forward and make a truthful
report.
It is not clear how successful this appeal was in persuading local 
authorities to confess previous instances of fraud, but the state did 
more than merely issue an appeal. Public Security Bureau personnel 
conducted a thorough examination of household registration figures 
prior to the census, registering any "illegal" children who were dis­
covered without imposing fines or other punishments (at least not at 
the time of registration). While this work was being accomplished, the 
state mobilized and trained hundreds of thousands of census workers 
from party and state organs, and on July 1 the final count began. Al­
though it will be some time before all the census data are analyzed 
and a final verdict can be pronounced, the precensus efforts appar­
ently paid off in the form of a reasonably accurate count, particularly 
given the size of the target population.'*
The results of the census shed light on the question of underreport­
ing over the last several years. The final count for July 1, 1990, was 
1.13 billion, and the year-end estimate for 1990 was 1.143 billion. 
These figures translated into a reported population increase of 31 mil­
lion over the 1989 year-end estimate of 1.112 billion; in contrast, re-
Beijing Domestic Service, March 21, 1990, in FBIS, Daily Report, China, April 17, 
1990, pp. 24-25.
One need only think about the problem-plagued U.S. census of 1990, where the 
population to be counted was only one-fourth the size of the Chinese population, to 
appreciate what a monumental achievement this was. Nevertheless, 1 will leave it to 
demographic experts to give a final verdict on the overall reliability of the Chinese cen­
sus.
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ported increases for 1987, 1988, and 1989 were only half that number, 
hovering between 15 and 16 million. Clearly, the census figures re­
vealed serious underreporting over the last several years, which led to 
some hasty recalculating at the State Statistics Bureau (SSB) and the 
State Family Planning Commission. In announcing the 1990 year-end 
figure of 1.143 billion, for example, the SSB stated that the total had 
increased 16.29 million over that for 1989. That would put the 1989 
figure at approximately 1.127 billion, far higher than the total of 1.112 
billion actually reported in early 1990. And at the State Family Plan­
ning Commission, previous estimates of annual population increases 
during the Eighth Five Year Plan period (1991-95) were revised up­
ward from 16-17 million to 22-23 million.
Do these figures imply that China's "one-or-two-child" policy has 
been a failure? Not at all, but neither has it been a great success, if 
measured against the strict numerical goals of the 1980s. The goal of 
the Seventh Five Year Plan was to keep the average annual 
population-growth rate at around 12.5 per thousand; in fact, official 
figures averaged over 14 per thousand, and the actual figures may 
have been significantly higher. The total population goal of 1.12 bil­
lion by the end of 1990 was also exceeded by a substantial margin. 
The hope of reducing the total fertility rate to below 2.0 children per 
couple was not fulfilled either. Total fertility hovered around 2.3, and 
the total fertility rate for rural women remained high at 2.8. Put sim­
ply, that figure indicates that most rural women are having at least 
two children, and the proportion with a "forbidden" third child re­
mains substantial.
On the other hand, the one-child policy has been an unequivocal 
success in urban areas, where fertility levels have declined to 1.3. 
And although first births have remained stable since 1982, hovering 
around 51-52 percent of all births annually, third or higher-order 
births have dropped from 23 percent of all births in 1982 to only 15 
percent in 1990, a figure that would be much higher in the absence of 
China's strict policy.
Population Policy in the 1990s
What is the future of the one-child policy? In 1991 pressures esca­
lated to reduce population growth to an average annual level of "un­
der 12.5 per thousand," the formal goal of the Eighth Five Year Plan. 
The family planning propaganda apparatus was in full swing, central 
and provincial leaders were making strong statements about the ne­
cessity of clamping down on population growth, and the absence of a 
quick fix for a sluggish economy led some to refocus on the "denomi-
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nator” (population growth) as an easy target. In addition, in rura 
provinces such as Hebei that had exceeded the boundaries central 
policy by tolerating a two-child limit across the board, rural childbear­
ing regulations have been tightened, fines on rural offenders have 
been raised sharply, and pressures to reduce birth limits for minonty 
nationalities are rising.i^
Despite all these rumblings, however, there is no reason to expect 
that China will do anything other than "stay the course" on popula­
tion control during the 1990^that is, continue to irnplement the ur­
ban one-child policy and the rural "one-son-or-two-child Policy. The 
renewed propaganda and campaignlike mobilization are predictable 
responses to the bad news of 1990. The census was a ma)or embar- 
rasLent to some provincial officials, revealing a wide gap Between 
their performance and the goals of the Seventh Five Year plan. With 
1991 ushering in a new five-year plan, those same leaders anxiety to 
show that they had taken steps to remedy the problem triggered a 
noisy mobilization whose actual effect is yet to be seen.
With CCP General Secretary Jiang Zemin and Prime Minister Li 
Peng delivering tough speeches at a national family planning meehng 
in April 1991, warning that the slightest relaxation m efforts would 
mean a population in excess of 1.3 billion by the turn of the century, 
all local party officials have been put on notice that their performance 
must improve during the 1991-95 period. Even with the renewed 
sense of urgency and the escalating rhetoric, however, the statements 
of central leaders reveal the tightrope that is being walked^ On the 
one hand, the leadership believes that the existing policy should be 
enforced rigorously, even if it means canceling *e universal two-child 
policy that peasants in some areas have enjoyed. On the other hand, 
repeated references to the need for slow, sustained educahon, for so­
lutions to real peasant problems, and for adherence to the mass 
line" (i.e., staying close to the peasants, responding to their prob­
lems, and helping them to accept policies deemed to be in their bes 
interests) show that the leaders are equally aware of the dangers o 
pushing too far. Those dangers became all too apparent dunng the 
last big push for population control in 1983 and 1984, when cadres 
were far less vulnerable than they are today. In the post-Tiananmen 
era, in which concerns for overall regime stability remain paramount
..Personal interview files, Hebei province, July Wl. On 
among minority nationalities, see Zhang Tianlu, "Slow Down oZ m
mote Nationality Prosperity," People's Daily, July 10, 1991, p.
China, July 16, 1991, pp. 36-37; see also, Gansu People s Radio Network, June 12, 199 , 
in FBIS, Daily Report, China, June 19, 1991, p. 31.
The Population Factor: China's Family Planning Policy in the 1990s 115
and local governments are more likely to weigh central pressures 
against local interests, local leaders will think twice before pressing 
too hard.
Moreover, even the best efforts of the family planning apparatus, 
which is composed of 180,000 full-time cadres at the county level and 
below and supplemented by 35 million activists organized in local 
family planning associations, will be inadequate for the task ahead in 
the 1990s. 1® The numbers are staggering: during the 1991-95 period, 
the number of women of childbearing age (15-49) will average 322 
million per year, and the number of women in their peak birth years 
(ages 20 to 29) will reach 122 million per year. Those figures represent 
increases of 8 percent and 16 percent, respectively, over the 1986-90 
period. Similarly, it is estimated that births will total 23 million per 
year, stretching the resources of a bureaucracy that is already 
strapped financially,
Indeed, finances are another reason for doubting that there will be 
any major improvement in implementation of the birth limits. Al­
though the 1991 "Decision" on family planning called for a gradual 
increase in expenditure from the current one yuan per capita to two 
yuan by 1995, it will be up to local governments to find the money. 
While some have pledged to do so, the reality is that township and 
village governments with very limited resources must pay for much of 
the cost of local enforcement. With the size of their clientele continu­
ing to expand during the early 1990s, it is hard to see how marginal 
increases in funding allocations will translate into improved perfor­
mance.
A final reason for expecting China to "stay the course" on family 
planning is a subtle change in recent years in the assumptions that 
undergird China's birth planning program. In the early 1980s, all of 
the major documents, speeches, and editorials on family planning 
stressed that China could achieve its economic development goals 
only if it successfully contained population growth. In other words, 
population control was seen as the prerequisite for economic develop­
ment, given China's distinctive population burden and demographic 
structure. In part, this logic flowed directly out of the "central plan­
's Wang Shoudao, "Great Practice in Resolving China's Population Problem: Written 
to Commemorate 70th CPC Founding Anniversary," Guangmittg ribao, July 7, 1991, p. 2, 
in FBIS, Daily Report, China, July 24, 1991, p. 31.
Chinese sources also estimate an annual net growth of 17 million or more per year, 
"equal to the size of a medium-sized country." To put it another way, compare it with 
official statistics from the U.S. census of 1990, which showed a net population gain of 
22 million in ten years! Xinhua Domestic Service, January 24, 1991, in FBIS, Daily Report, 
China, January 31, 1991, p. 26.
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nine" approach to population control that had been institutionalized 
during the 1970s. Just as important, however, this logic was rein­
forced by the emphasis of the Deng regime on rapid modemi^ahon 
and the foar of the reformers that new economic policies would take 
some time to translate into tangible economic gams. 
and 1980, when Deng and his supporters were still ^un
battles against "leftists" of various stripes, Deng and Chen Yun 
Sed hfavy emphasis on the continuing problem of rural poverty 
^d hunger in order to garner support for a more pragmatic approach 
to rural policy. Not knowing how successful those reforms w 
eventually prove to be, however, they understandably beared that 
population growth would negate short-term gams and undercut the 
Itiength of their reformist position. If population growth were quicWy 
contafned, on the other hand, economic gams would occur more rap 
idly, and the payoff-in both economic and political terms-would be
“Snfwith this logic, birth planning was billed as the guaranw 
of eco^L development, the one factor on which the 
ure of China's development program ultimately depended. By 198 , 
however, a revisionist view began to emerge among ^^mily planning 
atoinistrators and young demographers. Jnew thmkmg ao
cepted the need for strict birth planning m China, but took a mo 
traditional view on the relationship between fertility 
ment. Inverting the assumption that had dominated O^meK argu 
ments in the 1970s and early 1980s, the revisionists argued that fur 
S^^rd “lines in fertility would most likely result frou, the process of 
mSerSiHon, not facilitate it, since lower fertility levels were closely 
associated with higher income and educational levels. 1 roponents o 
Sis wew did not |o so far as to suggest that the birth planning pro­
gram be repealed, but they did use it to garner support for a mote re-
“’‘1^199?'th^'cmsus results and the 198b-90 performance shortfalls
have renewed the emphasis on populaUon “ ^"‘‘Xen
able condition" for achieving economic goals during the 1990s. Ne 
theless with a decade of research and analysis to draw on, experts i 
China continue to stress that fertility is closely associated wifo levels 
of urbanization, economic development, and educahon. Working 
torn that assumption, family planning offidals h»ve tee" succ^^M 
in fending off their very vocal crifacs, who believe that the relaxatio 
of mrS birth limits waT a poUcy disaster. And ‘mPof nh th'y
have been successful in persuading Chinas
problem with China's birth planning policy does not he with the po 
icy itself, but with the way in which it is being implemented.
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None of this is to say that China has gone soft on family planning. 
On the contrary, it continues to implement the most intrusive and 
limiting family planning program in the world, and that program 
touches the lives of more than one-fifth of humanity. Some couples 
comply voluntarily, and some offenders (especially protected party of­
ficials) can get away with little punishment, or with steep fines that 
they are able or willing to pay. For the rest, however, it is a manda­
tory program. They may understand national appeals for reducing 
population growth, but they comply with local birth limits under ad­
ministrative threat.
The compulsory character of China's family planning program has 
made it a sensitive issue in U.S.-China relations, but the choices ap­
pear less clear-cut in Beijing than they do in Washington, D.C. If the 
current birth limitation policy is continued successfully, it can be esti­
mated conservatively that China will still add at least 160 million to its 
population base by the end of the decade (the equivalent of roughly 
two-thirds of the 1990 population of the United States), and the num­
bers will continue to climb until well into the 21st century. China al­
ready ranks as the world's largest grain producer, but even if it is suc­
cessful in raising output from 400 to 500 million tons by the year 2000 
(an unlikely achievement), per capita production will remain steady 
and surplus grain supplies will be limited. At present, each person in 
China is supported by 853 square meters of cultivated land, about 
one-ninth of the average land area for each American; by the end of 
the century, however, that figure will be closer to 700 square 
meters.And while China's current working-age population numbers 
727 million, that number will reach 858 million by the year 2000 and 
977 million by 2020.
The implications of these figures are staggering and raise funda­
mental questions about China's future. One of those questions is how 
the current or any successor regime will cope with a modernizing so­
ciety of such vast proportions. A second, more troubling question is 
whether there is a population threshold beyond which no regime 
could effectively rule.
2“ Frederick W. Crook, "Primary Issues in China's Grain Economy in the 1990 Dec­
ade," in U.S. Congress, Joint Economic Committee, China's Economic Dilemmas in the 
1990s: The Problems of Reforms, Modernization, and Interdependence, Vol. 1 (Washington, 
D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1991), pp. 385-402.
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fined as 16 to 54. Xinhua Domestic Service, June 19, 1991, in FBIS, Daily Report, China, 
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